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PUBLIC FUNDS AND THE HISTORICAL PRESERVATION
OF CHURCHES: PRESERVING HISTORY OR
ADVANCING RELIGION?
DINA A. KEEVER
[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral [sic] in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does
not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to
be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.'
I. INTRODUCTION
T preservation of historic properties and structures in our national
environment serves an important role in conserving our social and
cultural history for present and future generations. Preserving history
is a crucial part of enriching and developing our culture, our quality
of life, and our future. Federal, state, and local historical preservation
funds have been used to preserve a wide array of diverse structures,
from George Washington's Mt. Vernon to the Main Street businesses
of Viroqua, Wisconsin.2
Most controversies surrounding the distribution of public money
for historical preservation center around two issues: (1) which struc-
tures should receive historical preservation funds, and (2) what hap-
pens to the property rights of the owners once a structure is deemed a
historical landmark. When public funds are used to preserve churches,
however, two other issues come into play. First, when the government
donates public funds to preserve historical church buildings, do gov-
ernmental restrictions placed on the use of the funds violate the
church members' Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment?
And second, does the mere act of donating public funds to churches
1. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (holding the Establishment Clause
applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment and upholding a state statute provid-
ing bus transportation for children attending parochial schools).
In Everson, the Court reasoned that because the State of New Jersey was providing bus trans-
portation to students of public schools, the same privilege must be extended to students of paro-
chial schools so that all citizens would be treated equally without regard to their religious beliefs.
Id.
2. Patrick Rains, Flight or Fight: The Town That Took on Wa-Mart-and Won, 107 AM.
Crry & CouNrn 50 (Nov. 1992).
1328 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 21:1327
violate the Establishment Clause's charge that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion"? 3 The first issue con-
cerning the preservation of churches has been litigated in federal4 and
state court' and has been discussed extensively by several commenta-
tors.6 The second issue, however, seems to have fallen through the
cracks in religious funding jurisprudence. 7 Although no court has di-
rectly considered the issue of using public funds to historically pre-
serve churches, the United States Supreme Court has issued almost
fifty years worth of "modern" religious funding decisions8 which this
Comment will attempt to analyze and analogize to the Establishment
Clause concerns involved in donating the government's money for the
historical preservation of churches.
II. THE LEMON TEST-A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT TEST USED IN
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES
The United States Supreme Court has, over time, interpreted the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause to afford protection from
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sover-
3. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
4. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).
5. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990) (en banc),
vacated and remanded, 499 U.S. 901 (1991).
6. Note, Model Free Exercise Challenges for Religious Landmarks, 34 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 144 (1983); Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1562 (1984); Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional
Limits to Landmark Preservation and Architectural Review, 36 VILL. L. REV. 401 (1991); Ri-
chard F. Babcock & David A. Theriaque, Landmarks Preservation Ordinances: Are the Religion
Clauses Violated by Their Application to Religious Properties?, 7 FLA. ST. U. J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 165 (1992).
7. However, one constitutional law professor in Florida, Professor Steven G. Gey of Flor-
ida State University College of Law, has brought the issue to the attention of local and state
media. See Martin Dyckman, What About St. John's?, ST. PETERSBURO TIMES, Sept. 3, 1993, at
D3.
For an opposite viewpoint concerning a similar issue, community development block grants,
see "Christian" Businesses Denied Main Street $$ (Persecution in the 90s), PERRY TIMES (Perry.
Fla.), Oct. 27, 1993, at BI.
8. The United States Supreme Court's initial interpretation of the Establishment Clause
allowed the government to support religion provided it did not discriminate against any type of
religion. See Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (ISIS). As Justice Joseph Story wrote the
majority opinion in the case, this is referred to as the "Story View."
The "modern" view of the Establishment Clause began in 1947 with the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, the
Court upheld a New Jersey statute providing bus transportation to parochial school children.
The majority interpreted the Establishment Clause to mean that the government was required to
remain "neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers." Id. at 18.
This Comment will consider the Supreme Court case law which has evolved in the religious
financing area since Everson.
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eign in religious activity." 9 In attempting to ensure these protections,
the Court, since 1971, has used the three-prong Lemon test"' to assess
a statute's constitutionality under the Establishment Clause. For a law
to be declared constitutional under the test, it (1) must have a secular
purpose, (2) must have a primary effect that neither materially inhibits
nor advances religion, and (3) must not excessively entangle religion
and governmental institutions." Although the test derives its name
from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 2 the case where it was first articulated,
many think it is appropriately named due to the inconsistent results it
has produced. 3 In fact, on various occasions, five of the current
Justices of the United States Supreme Court 4 have criticized the test
for its inadequacies. For example, in her concurrence in Wallace v.
Jaffree,5 Justice O'Connor noted that the Lemon test should be "re-
examined and refined . . . to make [it] more useful in achieving the
underlying purpose of the First Amendment."' 6 Also in Wallace,
Justice Rehnquist criticized each prong of Lemon and noted the con-
tradictory results often achieved in applying the test.17 Referring to the
Lemon test, he stated, "[i]f a constitutional theory has no basis in the
history of the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and
yields unprincipled results, I see little use in it."I8 Justice Kennedy also
questioned the test in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 9 where he
agreed that "[plersuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged." 20 And,
Justice Souter, in his confirmation hearings before the United States
Senate in 1990, stated that he also views the Lemon test to be in
direct conflict with the Free Exercise Clause and that the test causes a
"difficulty which sooner or later the Court has to resolve."'2 Finally,
9. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (upholding state tax exemptions for real
property owned by religious organizations and used for religious worship).
10. The Lemon test was first set forth by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
11. See id. at 612-13.
12. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
13. Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. Rls. L. REv. 795 (1993); Roald Y.
Mykkeltvedt, Souring on Lemon: The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause in Transition, 44
MERCER L. REv. 881 (1993).
14. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter have all criticized the
Lemon test. Justice White who dissented from the decision in Lemon, also has strongly criticized
the test. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
15. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 110-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19. 492 U.S. 573, 655-79 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20. Id. at 655.
21. Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 156
(1990) (statement of nominee).
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Justice Scalia has made no "bones" about the way he feels about
Lemon. In his "night at the theater" concurrence in the 1993 Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District22 decision,
Justice Scalia lamented that the test is "[like some ghoul in a late-
night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried .... -2" Justice
Scalia accused the Lemon test of "stalking" Establishment Clause
jurisprudenceA and pointed out to the Court that "[w]hen we wish to
strike down a practice [Lemon] forbids, we invoke it . . .; when we
wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely." 25
Because the Court has so heavily criticized the Lemon test, many
commentators interpreted the Court's failure to apply Lemon in the
1992 Lee v. Weisman2 decision to signify that the Lemon test was
gone forever.17 However, the Court's refusal to effectively repudiate
the test in Lee and the resurfacing of the test in Lamb's Chapel indi-
cate that Lemon may still control the Court's Establishment Clause
analysis. Thus, because the Court has not officially disposed of
Lemon, it is the first test this Comment will use to gauge the constitu-
tionality of statutes that allow the use of public funds for the preser-
vation of church buildings.
III. APPLYING LEMON TO HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACTS
As stated above in Part II, in order for a government action to be
found constitutional under the Lemon test, it must (1) have a secular
purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither materially inhibits nor
advances religion, and (3) not excessively entangle religion and gov-
ernmental institutions. 2 The following analysis will apply these three
prongs to a typical historic preservation statute, such as the National
Historic Preservation Act. 29
22. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
23. Id. at 2149 (Scalia, J., concurring).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2150 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia cited to Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985), where the Court struck down state remedial education programs administered in part in
parochial schools, and to Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), where the Court upheld state
legislative chaplains, as examples.
26. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (finding state statute allowing nondenominational invocations
and benedictions at public school graduation ceremonies unconstitutional).
27. See Paulsen, supra note 13.
28. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470x-6.
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A. Secular Purpose
It is not difficult to argue that the purpose behind any historical
preservation statute is secular. In applying the secular purpose prong
of Lemon, the Court has stated that "it is appropriate to ask 'whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of relig-
ion."'30 It is very difficult for a governmental action to fail this first
prong of Lemon, as was demonstrated in Lynch v. Donnelly3' where
the Court found that a creche, clearly a religious symbol, in a holiday
display on government property did not violate the Lemon secular
purpose prong because "[t]he evident purpose of including the creche
in the larger display was not promotion of the religious content of the
creche but celebration of the public holiday through its traditional
symbols. ' 3 2 In fact, in several cases where the Court has ultimately
found a violation of the Establishment Clause, the Court has deter-
mined that a secular purpose was behind the governmental action at
issue. For example, in Lemon itself, the Court found that the pur-
poses of the state statutes at issue were clearly "to enhance the quality
of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory at-
tendance laws," 33 even though the statutes, allowing for salary supple-
ments for parochial school teachers teaching secular subjects, were
found unconstitutional due to excessive entanglement between govern-
ment and religion .34
In cases where the Court has found a violation of the first prong of
Lemon, the statutes or government actions at issue have been found
to have actual purposes of advancing religion even though those pur-
poses were cleverly disguised by state legislatures. For example, in ap-
plying the purpose prong in Wallace v. Jaffree, 3 the Court found an
Alabama statute authorizing a period of silence for "meditation or
voluntary prayer" unconstitutional because the legislative history of
the statute indicated that the statute's sole purpose was to express
"the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the
beginning of each schoolday." 36 In addition, the Court found that the
use of the words "voluntary prayer" in the statute clearly "indicates
that the State intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice." 37
30. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
31. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
32. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
33. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
34. Id. at 624-25.
35. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
36. Id. at 59-60.
37. Id.
1994]
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The Court concluded that "[siuch an endorsement is not consistent
with the established principle that the government must pursue a
course of complete neutrality toward religion" and that the statute
therefore violated the Establishment Clause. 38
The Court also found a violation of Lemon's first prong in Ed-
wards v. Aguillard39 where it stated that "[wIhile the Court is nor-
mally deferential to a State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is
required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not a
sham.'"'4 In Edwards, after reviewing state legislative history, the
Court found that the primary purpose of the Louisiana Balanced
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution Science in Public
School Instruction Act was to change the Louisiana public school sci-
ence curriculum to provide a persuasive advantage to a particular re-
ligious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of evolution, not to
promote academic freedom, which the Louisiana Legislature had
stated as the purpose of the Act.4 1
Similarly, in Stone v. Graham,42 the Court invalidated Kentucky's
requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted in public class-
rooms, rejecting the state's contention that the law was designed to
provide instruction on a "fundamental legal code." ' 43 The Court
stated that "[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in
the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a sup-
posed secular purpose can blind us to that fact. '"4
Conversely, the National Historic Preservation Act, 45 like most his-
toric preservation statutes, does not mention religion, nor is the ad-
vancement of religion a part of the Act's goal. The clear purpose of
the Act is to preserve history. The Act's declaration of policy provides
that "the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be
preserved as a living part of our community life and development in
38. Id. at 60-61.
39. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
40. Id. at 586-87.
41. Id. at 586. In Edwards, the Court found it clear from the legislative history of the Act
that the purpose of the Act's legislative sponsor, Senator Bill Keith, was to narrow the public
schools' science curriculum and that academic freedom was not advanced by the Act. Id. at 587.
It is equally clear that requiring schools to teach creation science with evolution
does not advance academic freedom. The Act does not grant teachers a flexibility that
they did not already possess to supplant the present science curriculum with the pres-
entation of theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life.
Id.
42. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
43. Id. at 41.
44. Id.
45. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1993).
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order to give a sense of orientation to the American people" 46 and
that "the preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public
interest so that its vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, in-
spirational, economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and en-
riched for future generations of Americans." ' 47 Only if the
government's action is "motivated wholly by an impermissible pur-
pose" to advance religion will the first prong of the Lemon test be
violated.4 It is highly improbable that the Supreme Court, or any
court, would find that a historic preservation statute designed to pre-
serve historic structures is actually motivated by a governmental pur-
pose to advance religion.
B. Primary Effect
Even though a historic preservation statute may be motivated by a
secular purpose, for the statute to pass the Lemon test, the state must
also demonstrate that granting public funds to churches for historic
preservation does not have a primary effect of advancing religion. The
primary effect question is usually the most difficult one to answer in
Establishment Clause cases. 49
In Bowen v. Kendrick,10 the Court directly considered whether al-
lowing religious institutions to participate as recipients of federal
funds violates the primary effect prong of Lemon." In Bowen, the
Court examined the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life
Act (AFLA), which allowed religious organizations to receive federal
funds for use in teenage sexuality counseling.52 The Bowen Court
noted that the AFLA made funds available to a "fairly wide spectrum
of organizations" 53 and that nothing on the face of the Act suggested
that it was "anything but neutral with respect to the grantee's status
as a sectarian or purely secular institution." 4 Based on these charac-
teristics of the AFLA, features which are also a part of the National
Historic Preservation Act, the Court reasoned that the Act was similar
to other statutes which have survived Establishment Clause chal-
46. Id. § 470(b)(2).
47. Id. § 470(b)(4).
48. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
680 (1984)); see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1987).
49. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 604; see, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
50. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
51. Id. at 606-13.
52. Id. at 606.
53. Id. at 608.
54. Id.
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lenges-such as the Maryland statute in Roemer v. Board of Public
Works that provided subsidies directly to qualifying colleges and uni-
versities, including religiously affiliated institutions-and found that
the AFLA was neutral on its face.16 The Bowen Court then stated that
in order to properly assess the primary effect of the Act, it must also
consider to what extent the statute directed government aid to "perva-
sively sectarian" institutions. 7 The Court noted that "we have always
been careful to ensure that direct government aid to religiously affili-
ated institutions does not have the primary effect of advancing relig-
ion. One way in which direct government aid might have that effect is
if the aid flows to institutions that are 'pervasively sectarian."'' 8 The
Court then reiterated its finding in Hunt v. McNair59 that "[a]id nor-
mally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion
when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a
substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mis-
sion . . . "60 The Bowen case was then remanded for a determination
as to whether particular grantees should be considered "pervasively
sectarian" religious institutions6 and whether the AFLA aid "has
been used to fund 'specifically religious activit[ies] in an otherwise
substantially secular setting."' 62
The Bowen decision is problematic in that the Court has not yet
clearly defined the "pervasively sectarian" concept. At least one
Justice is unsure about the term's meaning. Justice Kennedy stated in
his concurrence in Bowen that "I am not confident that the term 'per-
vasively sectarian' is a well-founded juridical category .... ",63 Justice
Kennedy went on to state that "I recognize the thrust of our previous
decisions that a statute which provides for exclusive or disproportion-
55. 426 U.S. 736 (1976). In Roemer, the plurality opinionpointed out that "religious insti-
tutions need not be quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally available to all." Id. at
746.
56. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 608-09.
57. Id. at 609-10.
58. Id.
59. 413 U.S. 734, 734-35 (1973) (rejecting a challenge to a South Carolina statute that made
certain benefits "available to all institutions of higher education in the State, whether or not they
have a religious affiliation").
60. Id. at 743 (emphasis added).
61. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 621.
62. Id. (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
63. Id. at 624 (Kennedy, J.. concurring). Justice Blackmun also stated in his dissent to
Bowen that "pervasively sectarian" is a "vaguely defined term of art" that "allows us to eschew
further inquiry into the use that will be made of direct government aid." Id. at 633 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun further warned that "[the label thus serves in some cases as a
proxy for a more detailed analysis of the institution, the nature of the aid, and the manner in
which the aid may be used." Id.
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ate funding to pervasively sectarian institutions may impermissibly ad-
vance religion and as such be invalid on its face."64 But, according to
Justice Kennedy, because the Court had found the statute to be fa-
cially valid, it could not be unconstitutional as applied simply due to
the religious character of a specific recipient." Justice Kennedy argued
that the real question in an as-applied challenge is "not whether the
entity is of a religious character, but how it spends its grant. "
In applying the Bowen decision to the issue of granting funds to
churches under a historic preservation statute, some may argue that
churches are obviously "pervasively sectarian" and as such should be
denied direct governmental aid of this kind. However, an argument in
favor of giving preservation funds to churches can also be constructed
from Bowen's conclusions. First, it can be concluded from Bowen
that even if an institution is found to be pervasively sectarian (as
churches clearly are), it is merely presumed that the aid money is be-
ing spent for religious purposes. But, if that presumption can be re-
butted by evidence showing that the money is being used for non-
religious purposes, then the statute should be found constitutional. In
other words, borrowing from Justice Kennedy, 67 "pervasively sectar-
ian" is merely a label that presumes that the funds will be used for
religious purposes; but if it can be demonstrated that the funds will
not be used for religious purposes, and the statute is facially valid,
then the statute providing the funds should be constitutional.
For example, the Court in Bowen upheld giving money to religious
organizations where it could be shown that the money was used for
nonreligious counseling purposes. Similarly then, the Court should
uphold a statute granting funds to churches where it can be demon-
strated that the purpose of the funds is to historically preserve the
building in which the church is located, not to advance the religious
mission of the church. It is the structure itself, not the religion, that is
being preserved for the cultural enrichment of future generations. The
funds given to churches to preserve their buildings do not contribute
materially69 to the advancement of the religion that the church houses,
but merely ensure that the structure itself will survive for historical
purposes. Additionally, an argument can be made that to deny
churches historical preservation funds that are available to all other
64. Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 624-25.
67. See supra notes 67-70 & accompanying text.
68. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 612-13.
69. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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types of structures would actually be inhibiting religion, a practice
also prohibited by the Establishment Clause. 0
In Tilton v. Richardson,7 the Court held that the Higher Education
Facilities Act of 1963, authorizing grants to church-related colleges
and universities, was constitutional except for the portion of the Act
that provided for a twenty-year limitation on the use of the facilities
constructed with federal funds. Despite finding that the purpose of
the Act was to expand college and university facilities to meet a
sharply rising number of young people demanding higher education,
the Tilton Court held that to allow the reversion of a facility to a
parochial school at the end of the twenty-year limitation period would
be an unconstitutional religious gift of taxpayers' funds.7 2 The Court
upheld the part of the Act authorizing building construction funds to
sectarian schools to be used for non-religious purposes, but invali-
dated the part of the Act that allowed the buildings to be used for
religious purposes after a twenty-year period. Some may argue that
this holding implies that government grants for buildings that are used
for religious purposes, such as historical preservation grants to
churches, are unconstitutional. In Tilton, however, the Court strongly
relied on the argument that to allow the buildings to be used for relig-
ious purposes after twenty years would undermine the purpose of the
Act at issue, which was to promote higher education. In the situation
at hand, the primary purpose of the historical preservation statute is
to preserve history, and even if the building is used as a church, that
purpose is still fulfilled. Furthermore, because the purpose of a histor-
ical preservation statute is to preserve history, any benefit to religion
resulting from the statute can be characterized as incidental. As the
Court in Tilton pointed out, in religious funding cases, "[tihe crucial
question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution
as a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal
or primary effect advances religion." 73 The principal or primary effect
of donating public funds to preserve church buildings is to preserve
historic structures, not to advance religion. If religious buildings meet
the same criteria that other types of buildings entitled to historic pres-
ervation funds are required to meet, then denying religious buildings
access to historic preservation funds would be equivalent to determin-
ing that "a church could not be protected by the police and fire de-
70, The Establishment Clause has been interpreted to mean that the government must be
neutral toward religion. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
71. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
72. Id. at 692.
73. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
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partments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair' 7 4 -an argument
that was rejected by the Court long ago.7 1
Furthermore, Tilton and Committee for Public Education & Relig-
ious Liberty v. Nyquist26 a case where the Court invalidated mainte-
nance and repair grants to nonpublic schools, can both be
distinguished from the historical preservation issue at hand. Following
the reasoning in Tilton, the Nyquist Court stated that "[i]f the State
may not erect buildings in which religious activities are to take place,
it may not maintain such buildings or renovate them when they fall
into disrepair."" Both Tilton and Nyquist, however, involved public
funding for sectarian educational institutions, not for churches. The
Court has frequently stated that public aid to nonpublic schools is
problematic because children are impressionable and may perceive the
state aid as an endorsement of religion. Yet, granting public aid for
the preservation of historic church buildings does not promote relig-
ious education of children, but merely preserves church structures to
enrich the historic culture of society. Furthermore, an argument can
also be made that the Court's recent analysis in Bowen supersedes the
analysis the Court used in Tilton and Nyquist, both which were cases
decided in the early 1970s when the Court first began interpreting the
Lemon test.
C. Entanglement
The entanglement prong of Lemon has been strongly criticized,
mainly because of the vagueness of the term "excessive."76 Neverthe-
less, a complete analysis under the Lemon test must include a determi-
nation as to whether a statute fosters excessive entanglement between
government and religion. In answering this inquiry, a court must look
at three factors: (1) the character and purpose of the institutions bene-
fitted; (2) the nature of the aid; and (3) the nature of the 'relationship
between the government and the religious organization. 79 In Bowen,
the entanglement prong was found to permit government monitoring
to enforce the terms of a grant condition that forbade use of the funds
74. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981) (quoting Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
75. See id. at 275.
76. 413 U.S. 756(1973).
77. Id. at 777.
78. See Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entan-
glement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205 (1980);
see also kguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1971).
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for religious purposes.* When the government donates historical pres-
ervation funds to a church, a similar finding should be made that the
terms of the grant can be enforced without the government becoming
involved in the religious affairs of the church. In Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Board of Equalization,"' the Court stated that "we have
held that generally applicable administrative and recordkeeping regu-
lations may be imposed on religious organization without running
afoul of the Establishment Clause."8 The Court has also stated in
Hernandez v. Commissioner3 that "routine regulatory interaction
which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine ... no delegation
of state power to a religious body . . . and no 'detailed monitoring
and close administrative contact' between secular and religious bodies
.. does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command.''14 Ac-
cording to both of these cases, governmental monitoring of historical
preservation funds, which would probably require a church to make
bookkeeping and accounting reports of its preservation expenditures,
would not seem to "excessively" entangle the government in the af-
fairs of religion.
IV. ALTERNATIVE TESTS
Applying the Lemon test to historic preservation statutes is a diffi-
cult analysis. It may be that the Court would not apply the Lemon test
if faced with the issue. In fact, as stated in Part II, as several members
of the Court have demonstrated a dissatisfaction with Lemon, the
Court may instead apply Justice Kennedy's "coercion" test from
County of Allegheny v. ACLU or Justice O'Connor's "endorsement"
test from Lynch v. Donnelly in determining the constitutionality of
historic preservation statutes which allow the use of public funds for
the preservation of church buildings.
A. Justice Kennedy's Coercion Test
In 1989, Justice Kennedy wrote a significant dissent in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU"S endorsing a type of coercion test for Establish-
ment Clause case analysis.16 In applying the Lemon test in Allegheny,
80. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-17 (1988).
81. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
82. Id. at 395.
83. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
84. Id. at 696-97.
85. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
86. Id. at 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that
"[slubstantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order .... "). It is inter-
esting to note that in Allegheny, where five different opinions were produced, a majority could
not be mustered to support application of the Lemon test.
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the majority found that the holiday display of a creche in a county
courthouse was unconstitutional because it had the effect of promot-
ing or endorsing religious beliefs,87 while it found the holiday display
of a menorah in front of a city building constitutional because it did
not have the same effect.88 Justice Kennedy, however, applying his co-
ercion test in his partial dissent in Allegheny, maintained that both
religious displays should have been allowed. He opined that by read-
ing a nonendorsement mandate into Lemon's primary effect test, the
Court had in fact assumed a posture of hostility toward religion.89 In
support of his position, Justice Kennedy stated that "[g]overnment
policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for relig-
ion are an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage.'' 9 He
pointed out that two limiting principles clearly have emerged from the
Court's cases dealing with Establishment Clause issues:
[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding
hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in
such a degree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so. "91
These two limits are obviously intertwined because, as the Court
wrote:
[1It would be difficult indeed to establish a religion without some
measure of more or less subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation
to supply the substantial benefits that would sustain a state-
established faith, direct compulsion to observance, or governmental
exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing. 92
In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy recognized that "psychological" coer-
cion, a type of coercion different than the "direct coercion in the clas-
sic sense of an establishment of religion that the Framers knew," 93
could sometimes occur where governmental actions support religion.
Justice Kennedy observed that:
87. Id. at 621.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 655.
90. Id. at 657. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (upholding grants
to church-sponsored universities and colleges); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (ex-
empting churches from tax obligations); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S 236 (1968) (upholding
government programs supplying textbooks to parochial school students).
91. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
92. Id. at 659-60.
93. Id. at 660.
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[cloercion need not be a direct tax in aid of religion or a test oath.
Symbolic recognition or accommodation of religious faith may
violate the Clause in an extreme case. I doubt not, for example, that
the Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large
Latin cross on the roof of city hall. 94
Justice Kennedy argued that "such an obtrusive year-round religious
display would place the government's weight behind an obvious effort
to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion" 95 and thus would
dangerously border on establishing a state religion. Yet, even applying
this "psychological" coercion test, a test more stringent than a direct
coercion test that may have been applied by the Framers, the use of
public funds for the preservation of churches would arguably result in
a finding that the practice is constitutional. Justice Kennedy's pro-
posed test requires some kind of recognition on the part of the objec-
tor that the government's action somehow coerces the observer into
believing that government is supporting or establishing a religion. The
governmental practice of using grant money to restore and preserve
historic buildings, which include historic churches, seems unlikely to
psychologically "coerce" anyone into thinking that the government is
supporting a particular religion or religion in general. In fact, the
practice is likely to either go unnoticed by most," or be seen as gov-
ernmental attempt to preserve history, not to advance religion.
Clearly, granting public funds to preserve churches is very different
from erecting "a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall." 97
In his concurrence in Bowen v. Kendrick,98 Justice Kennedy argued
in favor of the constitutionality of providing federal grants to relig-
ious applicants where the grants are distributed in a neutral fashion to
religious and non-religious institutions alike. This argument suggests
that the author of the coercion test, if faced with the question, would
find that donating public funds for the historical preservation of
churches is constitutional, provided that the grants are neutrally dis-
tributed.
In writing the majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman," Justice Ken-
nedy also applied his coercion test from Allegheny as the constitu-
94. Id. at 661.
95. Id.
96. As is demonstrated by the fact that there are no cases on record objecting to the prac-
tice of granting public funds to churches for historical preservation.
97. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660.
98. 487 U.S. 589, 624 (1988). This opinion was written one year before Justice Kennedy
announced his coercion test in Allegheny.
99. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
HISTORICAL PRESER VA TION OF CHURCHES
tional test for evaluating prayer in public school graduation
ceremonies. He wrote, "[i]t is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a
way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to
do so." ' "0 The Lee Court, stating that "[tihe prayer exercises in this
case are especially improper because the State has in every practical
sense compelled attendance and participation in an explicit religious
exercise at an event of singular importance to every student, one the
objecting student had no real alternative to avoid,""0 ' declared prayer
in public school graduation ceremonies unconstitutional. Once again,
this analysis is based on a determination that individuals participating
in the graduation ceremonies would feel coerced or compelled to take
part in a religious activity. Under Justice Kennedy's coercion test, the
use of public funds for the historical preservation of churches would
arguably be found constitutional because it is difficult to imagine how
the practice would make individuals feel coerced into partaking in a
religious activity.
B. Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Test
Another test that has emerged in United States Supreme Court cases
involving Establishment Clause issues is Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment test. Justice O'Connor originally formulated the test in her con-
curring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,02 where she suggested a that a
clarification of the Court's Establishment Cause doctrine was neces-
sary. Justice O'Connor reasoned that in applying Lemon, "[w]hat is
crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of communi-
cating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of relig-
ion."'' 0 Justice O'Connor warned that "[eindorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political commu-
nity. ' "'4 In explaining her test, Justice O'Connor further stated that
"[flocusing on the evil of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion makes clear that the effect prong of the Lemon test is prop-
erly interpreted not to require invalidation of a government practice
merely because it in fact causes, even as a primary effect, advance-
100. Id. at 2655 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
101. Id at 2661.
102. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
103. Id. at 692.
104. Id. at 688.
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ment or inhibition of religion." 105 In support of her argument, Justice
O'Connor cited several cases where the Court had upheld laws even
though they were found to have such effects, such as Walz v. Tax
Commission,"1° where the Court upheld property tax exemptions for
religious, educational, and charitable organizations, and McGowan v.
Maryland,10 7 where the Court upheld mandatory Sunday closing laws.
In Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice O'Connor further refined her endorse-
ment test and stated that "[ujnder this view, Lemon's inquiry as to
the purpose and effect of a statute requires courts to examine whether
government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute
actually conveys a message of endorsement."'1 8 Justice O'Connor
noted that because of the coexistence of church and state in the
United States,
it is inevitable that the secular interests of government and the
religious interests of various sects and their adherents will frequently
intersect, conflict, and combine. A statute that ostensibly promotes a
secular interest often has an incidental or even a primary effect of
helping or hindering a sectarian belief. Chaos would ensue if every
such statute were invalid under the Establishment Clause.'0
Historical preservation statutes easily fall into this category of sta-
tutes.
In applying Justice O'Connor's test to a governmental action, the
relevant issue is whether an "objective observer" 10 would perceive the
action as a state endorsement of religion."' For example, Justice
O'Connor probably would have argued that the statute in Walz ex-
empting religious organizations from property taxes would be seen by
an objective observer as a broad program and would not have the
symbolic link between government and religion necessary to prove en-
dorsement." 2 In Justice O'Connor's concurrence to Wallace, she ar-
gued that a moment of silence law that is clearly drafted and
implemented to permit prayer, meditation, and reflection without en-
dorsing one alternative over the others, should also pass the endorse-
ment test."' Similarly, a'statute providing public funds to preserve
105. Id. at 691-92.
106. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
107. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
108. Wallace v. Jaffre¢, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 69-70.
110. Id. at 76.
111. Id.
112. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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historical buildings, including churches, would not likely be seen as an
endorsement of religion by the objective observer because it does not
favor churches over other types of structures. Furthermore, because
religion is undeniably a part of the culture of the United States, it is
counterintuitive for a reasonable person to find government endorse-
ment of religion in a statute which includes the preservation of
churches in its purpose to preserve historic buildings for the cultural
enrichment of future generations.
V. CONCLUSION
If neutrality towards religion is truly the goal of the Establishment
Clause, then the use of public funds for the preservation of our history
should not exclude religious structures from the culture we wish to
preserve. The proper inquiry in any Establishment Clause case should
be whether a law affects the exercise and non-exercise of religion. The
law should neither advance nor inhibit the exercise of any particular
religion as against the exercise of any other religion, or as against the
right not to exercise any religion. However, the application of the
Lemon test to governmental action does not always result in achieving
these goals. Perhaps a better test for assessing the constitutionality of
a statute under the Establishment Clause would be to determine
whether the statute coerces individuals to participate in religious activ-
ity, as Justice Kennedy has suggested. Or perhaps Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test, which analyzes governmental action to see if it com-
municates a message that government endorses or disapproves relig-
ion, would be an even better way to assess a statute's constitutionality
under the First Amendment. Whichever test the Court chooses to use
in the future, however, it is important that the Court keep in mind its
own conclusion that neutrality towards religion is the primary goal of
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
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